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FROM KEPONE TO EXXON VALDEZ OIL AND BEYOND:
AN OVERVIEW OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT*

In July 1975, officials from the Virginia State Department of
Health learned that employees of the Life Science Product Company ("Life Science"), in Hopewell, Virginia, had been poisoned
by a toxic chemical known as Kepone. Life Science had produced Kepone under contract for Allied Chemical Corporation
("Allied Chemical"), the original developer and manufacturer.
Shortly thereafter, state officials discovered that both Life Science and Allied Chemical had unlawfully discharged Kepone
into freshwater tributaries of the James River. In addition to
poisoning their own employees, Life Science and Allied Chemical had also contaminated Virginia's atmosphere, soil, and waterways with Kepone.
Fourteen years later, in March, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran
aground off the coast of Alaska releasing over eleven million
gallons of crude oil into the Alaskan environment. Within days,
cleanup crews and government officials were removing the oil
and assessing the environmental damage. However, the
government's cleanup activities following the Exxon spill were
more regulated, more intense, and certainly more expensive for
Exxon than the government activity following the Kepone discovery. Although the environmental damages caused by Allied
Chemical and Exxon were not equally significant, the difference
in subsequent restorative actions can be largely attributed to
changes in federal environmental law and public opinion.
Immediately following the Exxon Valdez incident, environmentalists, economists, and governmental officials began to
assess the damage. Pursuant to federal law, the parties involved in the Exxon cleanup activities were entitled to compen-

* This paper was selected as a winner of the first University of Richmond
Water Law Writing Competition.
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sation for their efforts.' These protective laws, however, were
not in force when the Kepone contamination was discovered.
Although the environmental damages resulting from Kepone
contamination were extensive, the prevailing law did not entitle
the Commonwealth of Virginia to restorative compensation and
the monetary damages imposed did not reflect the environmental damages inflicted.2 Instead, Allied Chemical was charged
with the maximum criminal fine allowable under existing federal law.3
The environmental damages caused by the Kepone and Exxon
incidents still affect the ecosystems of Virginia and Alaska.
Millions of dollars have been spent to clean up the damage in
each case, but questions remain as to the real costs of such
damage. Federal regulations currently provide procedures which
assist natural resource trustees in quantifying environmental
damage to natural resources caused by hazardous wastes and
oil spills.4 After the Exxon spill, these assessment procedures
were used to assess damages in excess of $3 billion, an amount
tempered by Exxon's $1.1 billion settlement. The $3 billion
amount included both "use" and "nonuse" values, arrived at by
using a damage assessment method which uses public surveys
to determine "passive-use" values.5 Because CERCLA and the
same natural resource damage assessment procedures were not
in place when the Kepone incident occurred, Allied Chemical
was charged only with a criminal fine which did not accurately
reflect the damage done, nor distinguish between use and nonuse values.
Although both the Kepone and Exxon incidents spawned
hundreds of personal injury lawsuits and other damage claims,
this paper focuses on the ability to assess environmental damage generated by such disasters. Section II focuses on the
Kepone case and the criminal penalties imposed. Section III
reviews federal and state natural resource damage assessment

1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
2. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 20, 27-28 and accompanying text.
4. See generally 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.93 (1994).
5. See infra part IV.
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regulations, the Ohio v. Department of the Interior6 decision,
and the future of natural resource damage assessment. The
current regulations were promulgated in 1991, in light of the
Ohio decision in which the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the measure of damages should reflect
restoration costs and that market value is only one of many
factors to be considered when assessing damages. Section IV
explores the assessability of "passive-use" values and non-market injuries, through the use of alternative assessment procedures, such as contingent valuation studies. Had such valuation
concepts been applied to the Kepone incident, Allied Chemical
would have owed millions more to the people of Virginia. Finally, Section V looks at the emergence of litigation-driven science
following the Exxon Valdez oil spill and its growing effect on
environmental law and science.
H. THE KEPONE INCIDENT AND THE PENALTIES IMPOSED
A. The Kepone Contamination
From 1966 to 1975, Allied Chemical produced Kepone,
THEIC, and TAIC at its Hopewell manufacturing complex 7 As
part of its normal business operations, Allied Chemical discharged its chemical manufacturing wastes into freshwater
tributaries of the James River, a principal Virginia waterway
that flows into the Chesapeake Bay.' Life Science, owned and
operated by two former Allied Chemical employees, had entered
into a "tolling contract" with Allied Chemical and began manufacturing Kepone in March 1974.' Less than one year later, in

6. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
7. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672, 2673 (T.C. 1992)
(3d Cir. 1992), affd without opinion, 54 F.3d 767 (1995) (hearing in United States
Tax Court concerning whether expenses relating to the Kepone incident were tax
deductible and containing an excellent recitation of the facts and litigation surrounding the Kepone incident). Kepone is a highly toxic chemical pesticide developed
by Allied Chemical during the late 1940s and early 1950s. It was marketed primarily
in Europe as an insecticide in potato farming, but small amounts were also sold in
Central America for use in banana groves and in the United States for use in ant
traps. THEIC and TAIC are biologically inactive chemicals used in commercial wire
manufacture. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Under a tolling contract, one company processes raw materials supplied by
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July 1975, officials from the Virginia State Department of
Health ordered Life Science to cease operations because the Department had learned that many Life Science employees and
their family members had been poisoned by Kepone.' °
The activities of Life Science and Allied Chemical resulted in
Kepone contamination of Virginia's atmosphere, soil, and waterways. The United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") found Kepone particulates in the atmosphere twenty
miles away from the plant, in addition to extensive Kepone
contamination of the Hopewell facility and the surrounding
area." Unacceptable levels of Kepone were found in the James
River and its local tributaries, as well as in shellfish and
finfish taken from the river."2 In response to these reports,
Virginia Governor Mills E. Godwin closed the James River and
portions of the Chesapeake Bay to commercial fishing in December 1975."s
B. The Criminal Charges and Sentence Imposed
As a result of the Kepone incident, hundreds of personal
injury and other damage claims were filed against Allied Chemical. 4 Approximately 10,500 persons alleging to have been
harmed by Kepone contamination, including Life Science employees and their families, fishermen and other members of the
Chesapeake Bay seafood industry, and the Virginia Water Control Board, sought to recover damages in excess of $25 billion. 5 At the request of Virginia officials, Allied Chemical had

another company which retains title to the raw materials and sells the processed
chemical compound to its customers. The first company then receives a "tolling" fee
for each unit produced. Id.
10. Id. at 2674. At least 62 current and former Life Science employees suffered
from Kepone poisoning. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The James River remained closed to fisherman for 13 years. Rex
Springston, Signs of Life After Disaster, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 2, 1995, at Al.
14. Allied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2674.
15. Id at 2675-76. Claims by Life Science employees, their families, and others
aggregated approximately $85 million; claims by almost 400 fishermen, alleging that
the closing of the James River and Chesapeake Bay impaired their livelihood aggregated $24 million; a class action suit brought against Allied Chemical on behalf of
some 10,000 fishermen and other members of the Bay-area seafood industry aggregat-
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voluntarily decontaminated the Life Science plant in September
1975, spending approximately $800,000 on the cleanup efforts. 6 However, additional cleanup expenses were incurred by
the Commonwealth of Virginia, the City of Hopewell, the EPA,
the Army Corps of Engineers, and other government agencies
involved in the investigation and its subsequent cleanup. 7
On May 7, 1976, a grand jury returned three indictments

against Allied Chemical. One was for 940 counts of unlawful
discharges of Kepone, THEIC, and TAIC wastes by Allied
Chemical at its Hopewell complex between 1971 and 1974.
Another was for aiding and abetting Life Science in the unlawful discharge of Kepone waste from 1974 through 1976.18 Allied Chemical pled nolo contendere to all 940 counts in the first
indictment. 9 On October 5, 1976, Judge Robert R. Merhige
sentenced Allied Chemical to pay the maximum fine on all 940
counts, $2,500 per count for counts 1 through 456 and $25,000

per count for counts 457 through 940, for a total fine of
$13,240,000.20 Judge Merhige stated that he was "satisfied

ed $25 billion; and the Virginia Water Control Board's suit against Allied Chemical
claimed $3.5 million in civil penalties. Id. at 2675.
16. Id. at 2675. Allied Chemical buried contaminated materials found at or near
the plant site and decontaminated 33 railway cars of water. Id. In addition to cleanup activities, the company also sponsored health tests for its employees and residents
of Hopewell and donated approximately $88,000 to the Medical College of Virginia,
which had treated several former Life Science employees affected by Kepone.
17. Id.
18. Id. Allied Chemical had government permits to discharge manufacturing
wastes into local waterways; however, the first indictment stated that Allied
Chemical's permit applications failed to list the Kepone, THEIC, and TAIC discharges.
Id. Each of the 940 counts represented a single day's discharge; 628 counts were for
THEIC and TAIC, 87 counts for TAIC and Kepone, and the remaining 225 counts for
Kepone alone. Id. at 2675-76. Had Allied Chemical listed Kepone on its permit, the
company probably would have received approval to discharge the toxic chemical. Robert H. Sand, Esq., Remarks at the University of Richmond Law Review State of the
Chesapeake Bay Symposium (Mar. 2, 1995).
19. Allied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2676. Allied Chemical initially pled not
guilty to all three indictments, but changed its plea to nolo contendere for the first
indictment on August 19, 1976. In the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. accepted this plea over the objection of the United States. Attorney, William B. Cummings. Allied Chemical was acquitted on all counts of the second and third indictments. Id.
20. Id. at 2677; see Clean Water Act § 309(c)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); Rivers and Harbors Act § 407, 33 U.S.C. § 3411 (1988). Although it may seem small in light of the Exxon settlement, this was the largest fine
imposed for environmental damage up until that time. The Honorable Robert R.
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that [Allied Chemical] would have been found guilty, or they
wouldn't have pled nolo," and that "Allied knew it was polluting
the waters."2 In addition to punishing the company, Judge
Merhige was hoping to send a message to other corporate polluters. He said, "I hope after this sentence, that every corporate
official, every corporate employee that has any reason to think
that pollution is going on, will think, 'If I don't do something
about it now, I am apt to be out of a job tomorrow.' I want the
officials to be concerned when they see it."22
Although Judge Merhige sentenced Allied Chemical to the
maximum criminal fine possible, he was concerned that the
fines could not be used to directly benefit the victims of Kepone
contamination." Because the criminal fines could not be allocated to the Commonwealth of Virginia, Judge Merhige stated
that he would consider a reduction in the fines in light of
"what actions, if any, [had] been voluntarily taken by [Allied
Chemical] to alleviate the horrendous effects that have occurred."24 Consequently, Allied Chemical created the Virginia
Environmental Endowment Fund and transferred $8,000,000 to
it.25 The Endowment was created to alleviate the effects of
Kepone on the environment and the affected persons and to
generally improve and enhance the quality of the environment
in Virginia."
In January 1977, Judge Merhige modified Allied Chemical's
sentence by setting fines for counts 740 through 940 at $25,000
per count, for a total of $5,000,000.7 He also granted Allied
Chemical five years' probation for counts 1 through 740.25 The

Merhige, Jr., Remarks at the University of Richmond Law Review State of the Chesapeake Bay Symposium (Mar. 2, 1995).
21. Allied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2677.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 2676-77. Judge Merhige wanted the people most affected to be
compensated although he was "satisfied . . . that this cannot be done under the law."
Id. at 2677.
24. Id. at 2677; see id. at 2677-80 (describing the conversations and negotiations
regarding Allied Chemical's "voluntary" contributions).
25. Id. at 2680.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Allied Chemical had filed a motion to reduce the $13,240,000 fine to
$1,483,000, the minimum provided by law. On behalf of the Department of Justice,
United States Attorney Cummings opposed a reduction in the fine, arguing that Al-
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sentence imposed upon Allied Chemical was a criminal fine, the
maximum amount established by statute. The dollar amount
was not based upon the environmental damages incurred, nor
the costs of restoration or replacement. At the time, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act did not exist,29 and natural resource damage assessments were not required by federal law. Although cleanup costs
were expected to exceed $20 million, Judge Merhige was basically limited in sentencing to the statutory maximum available
for permit violations." Although Allied Chemical and its outside experts conducted intensive research regarding methods of
retrieving Kepone from the James River and on the effects of
incineration of Kepone waste, such research was not used to
quantify the damage incurred pursuant to natural resource
damage assessment regulations.
III. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REGULATIONS

Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), certain categories
of potentially responsible parties are now liable for all removal
and remedial costs incurred by the government when natural

lied Chemical would claim a tax deduction for the payment to the Endowment and
thus "effectively further reduce the fine and lessen its penal and deterrent purpose."
Id. He was proven correct. Allied Chemical deducted the $8,000,000 that it had transferred to the Virginia Environmental Endowment Fund as an "ordinary and necessary
business" expense under section 162(a) on its 1977 federal income tax return, as well
as the $49,323 that it had paid in legal expenses relating to the organization of and
contribution to the Endowment. Id. The United States Tax Court held that, because
Allied Chemical made the $8 million payment to the Endowment "with the virtual
guarantee that the sentencing judge would reduce the criminal fine by at least that
amount," the payment was not "voluntary" and thus not exempt under section 162(f).
Id. at 2682. The court also held that even though the payment was made to the
Endowment to ensure that the people of Virginia received or benefitted from a portion of the criminal fine instead of being "paid to the government," the reality was
that the payment was a "fine or similar penalty" within the meaning of section
162(f). Id. at 2683.
29. See infra part III.
30. Allied-Signal, Inc., 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2683. Although natural resource damage assessment was not required by federal law, Judge Merhige considered Kepone's
effect on the environment when he charged Allied Chemical with the highest possible
fine. In sentencing Allied Chemical, Judge Merhige hoped to warn other polluters
that they would not be able to get away with unlawful discharges or environmental
atrocities. Id

758

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

29:751

resources are damaged by a release of hazardous substances.3
Natural resource damages encompass "damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or
loss .

."32

The Clean Water Act ("CWA"), amended by the Oil

Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"), creates similar liability for natural resource damages resulting from the discharge of oil into
navigable waters. 3
A. Natural Resource Damage Assessment Regulations3'
Together, CERCLA and OPA constitute the legislative foundation for natural resource damage assessment and compensatory liability. According to these federal statutes, natural resource trustees, which are government agencies, shall be compensated for environmental damages caused by the release of
hazardous substances or oil spills.3" To assist federal, state,
and Tribal natural resource trustees in identifying the "best
available" procedures for assessing natural resource damages,
the Department of the Interior ("DOI") has promulgated natural
resource damage assessment ('NRDA") regulations. 6 Natural
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
32. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C). An actionable "injury" is "a measurable adverse change,
either long- or short-term, in the chemical or physical quality or the viability of a
natural resource...." Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(v)
(1994).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f); Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 1002, 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (Supp.
V 1993).
34. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.93 (1994).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f); 33 U.S.C. § 2706.
36. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.43 (1994). For a history of natural resource damage assessment regulations, see 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 9042 (1987); 53
Fed. Reg. 5166 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 9769 (1988); 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (1994). Because
petroleum products are not defined as a hazardous substance under CERCLA, OPA
requires its own NRDA regulations to cover oil spills. 33 U.S.C. § 2706. CERCLA
requires that the Department of the Interior promulgate NRDA regulations, while a
1991 executive order assigned the responsibility of promulgating damage assessment
and liability regulations for damages from oil spills to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"). See U.S. President Signs Long-Awaited OPA 90
Executive Order, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP., Oct. 24, 1991, at 3, 4. DOI and
NOAA rulemaking are expected to develop in parallel. Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,749 (1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11)
(proposed Oct. 19, 1994). For more statutory information regarding NRDA, see David
Hodas, Natural Resource Damages: A Research Guide, 9 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 107
(1991).
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resource trustees may use the assessments when suing for
damages and compensation from liable parties."
Under CERCLA and the NRDA regulations, "[d]amages may
be recovered for those natural resources injuries that are not
fully remedied by response actions as well as public economic
values lost from the date of the discharge or release until the
resources have fully recovered."38 All sums recovered as compensation for natural resource injuries are for "use only to
restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent" of the injured natural resources. 9 However, CERCLA explicitly states that the
measure of damages "shall not be limited by the sums which
can be used to restore or replace such resources."4" Therefore,
CERCLA allows for compensation in excess of actual damages.
B. The Administrative and Technical Procedures for Natural
Resource Damage AssessmentDOrs NRDA rules establish administrative and technical
procedures for assessing natural resource damages caused by
the release of hazardous wastes.4 ' These natural resource damage regulations provide an administrative process for conducting
damage assessments which consists of four phases: (1) the
Preassessment phase, (2) the Assessment Plan phase, (3) the
Assessment phase, and (4) the Post-assessment phase.4 2 As
required by CERCLA the regulations also provide two types of
technical assessment procedures. "Type A" procedures are "standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring minimal
field observation."' "Type B" procedures are site-specific procedures for conducting detailed assessments in individual cases."

37.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(f); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f). The authority to sue for

natural resource damages was extended to Indian and foreign trustees under OPA. 33

U.S.C. § 2706(a). See also 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,749 (1994).
38. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,749 (1994); see 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,262 (1994).
Had such provisions been applied to the Kepone damages, the $800,000 spent on
response actions would have constituted only the tip of the iceberg of recovery costs.

39.
40.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
Id.

41. 43 C.F.R.
42. 43 C.F.R.
43. 42 U.S.C.
11.40-.41 (1994).
44. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 11.10-.93 (1994).
§ 11.13 (1994); see 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.20-.35 & 11.90-.93 (1994).
§ 9651 (c)(2)(A). For specific standard procedures, see 43 C.F.R. §§

§ 9651(c)(2)(B). For specific standard procedures, see 43 C.F.R. §§
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During the Preassessment phase, trustee officials decide
whether future assessment actions are warranted after a discharge or release is detected or reported.45 During the Assessment Plan phase, the trustees perform "various notification and
coordination activities ...

designed to focus and organize the

assessment, which helps ensure that only reasonable assessment costs are incurred."46 These precautionary procedures
provide more validity to the assessment activities in addition to
producing more reasonable assessment costs.
During the Assessment phase, trustee officials follow three
steps: (1) Injury Determination, (2) Quantification, and (3)
Damage Determination.47 If the trustee officials determine natural resources have been injured, and a pathway of exposure
exists between the site of discharge and the injured resource,
the trustee officials will then quantify the extent of resource
injuries by measuring the reduction from baseline conditions."
Baseline conditions are the "conditions that would have existed
at the assessment area had the discharge of oil or release of
the hazardous substance under investigation not occurred."49
The reduction in baseline conditions should reflect "the loss of
services that the injured resource would have provided had the
discharge or release not occurred.""
The type A and type B procedures are used to determine
actual injuries and damages during the Assessment phase.5 A
type A procedure is a standardized procedure involving minimal
field work. The only type A procedure that has been published
to date is the Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for

11.60-.84 (1994).
45. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.13(b), 11.20-.25 (1994). The regulations provide a number of
criteria to assist trustee officials in making this decision. Id.
46. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,750 (1994); see 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.13(c), 11.30-.35 (1994).
During the Assessment Plan Phase, the trustee officials also prepare a written Assessment Plan describing the procedures that will be used to determine injury and
damages. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,750.
47. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.13(e)(1)-(3), 11.40-.84 (1994).
48. 43 C.F.R. § 11.13(e)(1)-(2) (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,750 (1994); see also
43 C.F.R. §§ 11.61-.64 (1994).
49. 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (1994); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,750 (1994) ("Reductions from baseline conditions can be measured by evaluating the change in the
level of services provided by the injured resources.").
50. 43 C.F.R. § 11.13(e)(2) (1994).
51. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.40-.84 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749 52,750-51 (1994).
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Coastal and Marine Environments, which uses a computer
model to perform Injury Determination, 'Quantification, and
Damage Determination for minor discharges or releases only in
coastal or marine environments." DOI is currently developing
another type A computer model for use in the Great Lakes
environment.5 3
Type B procedures involve site-specific studies. The regulations divide natural resources into five categories: surface water
resources, ground water resources, air resources, geologic resources, and biological resources.5 4 The regulations also provide
specific definitions of injury for each category along with guidance on testing, sampling, and measuring methodologies used to
determine whether an injury has occurred, whether a pathway
of exposure exists, and whether a change in baseline conditions
exists.55 When type B procedures are used, trustee officials
must "identify and consider a reasonable number of possible alternatives for restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, and/or acquiring the equivalent of the injured resources."5" The trustees'
decisions are then documented in a Restoration and Compensation Determination Plan which is subject to public review and
comment.5 7
During the final stage, known as Damage Determination,
trustee officials calculate the monetary value of the damaged
natural resources." The primary measure of damages is the
cost of "restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of the equivalent of the injured natural resources and the
services those resources provide." 9 Trustees may also incorporate "compensable value" or "interim" damages, which include
the economic value of the services lost by the public from the
52. 43 C.F.R. § 11.41 (1994). The final rule was published on March 20, 1987.
See 52 Fed. Reg. 9042 (1987). DOI proposed to revise this Model in 1994 to incorporate a new computer model. 59 Fed. Reg. 63,300 (1994) (proposed Dec. 8, 1994). The
comment period has been extended to July 6, 1995. 60 Fed. Reg. 7155 (1994).
53. Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Type A Procedure for Great Lakes
Environment, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,319 (1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (proposed
Aug. 8, 1994); see infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
54. 43 C.F.R. § 11.62(a)-(f) (1994).
55. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.62-.73 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,751 (1994).
56. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,751 (1994); see 43 C.F.R. § 11.82 (1994).
57. 43 C.F.R. § 11.81 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,751.
58. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.80-.84 (1994).
59. 43 C.F.R. § 11.80(b) (1994).
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date of the discharge until the resources are restored, rehabilitated, replaced, and/or acquisition of the equivalent of the resources and their services to baseline. °
C. Assessments Performed in Accordance with the Regulations
Receive a Rebuttable Presumption in Court
While the assessment procedures are not mandatory, they
must be used in accordance with CERCLA and OPA regulations
in order to receive a rebuttable presumption of accuracy in judicial proceedings. 6 ' In other words, if the trustee follows the
procedures outlined in the rules, the burden of persuasion is
shifted to the potentially responsible parties for showing errors
or unreliability in assessment and valuation methods. The rebuttable presumption makes damage recovery less difficult and
environmental protection more easily attained.
D. State Law and Legislation-NRDA for Oil Spill Liability
Under state law, the parties responsible for oil spills and
hazardous waste contamination have long been liable for environmental damages. Today, many of the states have enacted
their own rules and regulations for assessing natural resource
damages. For example, Florida's Department of Natural Resources has developed a "compensation schedule" for assessing
damage to natural resources caused by oil spills.62 Under
Florida's formula, environmental damages are calculated based
on several key factors such as the amount and type of oil
spilled, the types and extent of habitat directly affected, the
proximity of endangered species, and the nearness to the
shore.6" Because Florida's plan is intended to be non-penalizing

60. 43 C.F.R. § 11.80(b) (1994). Total compensable value includes both use and
nonuse values.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C); 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10, 11.91(c) (1994). DOs regulations
may be used to obtain a rebuttable presumption for natural resource damage assessments under OPA until NOAA promulgates its own regulations. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749,
52,749 (1994) (citing Senate committee language, S. REP. No. 101-94, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1990) (comments regarding judicial review of the rebuttable presumption
were accepted until January 17, 1995).
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.121 (West 1995).
63. Id.
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and able to withstand courtroom judgments," it should save
money in legal costs and therefore allow damage compensation
to be applied entirely to environmental remediation.65
Washington State has also created a compensation table
under which oil spillers will be liable for penalties of $1 to $50
per gallon spilled.66 Pursuant to state regulations, the table
will be used if. "(a) restoration or enhancement of the injured
resources is not technically feasible; (b) damages are not
quantifiable at a reasonable cost; and (c) the restoration and
enhancement projects or studies proposed by the liable parties
are insufficient to adequately compensate the people of the
state for damages.""
In California, a $100 million trust fund has been established
to provide for quick cleanup, damage assessment, and wildlife
rehabilitation after a major oil spill when no responsible party
is immediately identified or available." Scientists from
California's Oil Spill Prevention and Response agency will assess natural resource damages, including the loss of "use or

64. See id. § 376.121(12) (West 1995) (creating a rebuttable presumption on behalf
of the Department in any administrative or judicial proceeding if the assessment is
performed in accordance with the rules).
65. See Alane Fitzgerald, Florida Creates Formula for Damage Assessment, OFFSHORE, Dec. 1991, at 22, 22.
66. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.366 (West 1992). The Washington regulations
also "calculate natural resource damages based on the amount of oil spilled, toxicity,
various environmental sensitivity factors and actions taken by the spiller." Rules for
Assessing Damages from Oil Spills Proposed by the Washington State Department of
Ecology, P.R. Newswire, Nov. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, P.R.
Newswire File. "As oil becomes more toxic and environmental sensitivity increases,
the dollar per gallon assessment also increases." Id. See also Washington: The Department of Ecology (DOE) has Proposed Rules for Assessing Damages from Oil Spills, ST.
ENV'T REP., Dec. 11, 1991. The new rules "would provide an alternative to the field
studies normally performed for assessments." Id. A Resource Damage Assessment
Committee (RDAC) comprised of state, federal, tribal and other natural resource
trustees will assess natural resource damages. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.368(2)
(West 1992).
67. WASH. CODE ANN. § 90.48.367(2) (West 1992). Once collected, damages will be
deposited into the Coastal Protection Fund to be spent for future restoration and
enhancement activities. Id. § 90.48.367(5).
68. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8670.46-.53 (West 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1995). The trust
fund will be financed in part by a one-time $.25 per barrel fee on petroleum delivered into or sent out of the state by pipeline, barge, or vessel. Id. §§ 8670.47.5-.48.
See also State Office Will Administer $100 Million Oil Spill Fund, P.R. Newswire,
May 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, P.R. Newswire File.
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which are the "passive" uses of natural resourcenjoyment,"
69
es.
In Louisiana, a comprehensive state Oil Spill Prevention and
Response Act complements the federal Act, but adds original
language aimed at avoiding jurisdictional disputes during a
spill response. 70 The Louisiana Act creates a statewide oil spill
contingency plan, which includes procedures for assessing damages to natural resources and a $15 million Oil Spill Contingency Fund.71 The Act also limits liability for vessels and facilities
based on size and location.7 2
In August 1994, Texas also revised its NRDA rules for assessing oil spill damages to natural resources in coastal waters.7 3 Unlike the federal NRDA regulations, the Texas rules
allow natural resource trustees to invite the public to take part
in determining whether an assessment is necessary and whether the rules require mediation of a disputed NRDA claim before
any court is involved. 74 NRDA liability caps may be invoked
depending on a facility's oil handling capacity, but the caps
offer no protection when spills are the result of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a violation of state or federal safety regulations. 75 Similar to federal law, the Texas rules describe the scientific and economic methods which trustees may
69. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8670.56.5(7) (West 1992 & Curn. Supp. 1995).
70. LA REV. STAT. ANN., § 30:2451-2496 (West Supp. 1995). See also Louisiana's
Legislature Passes a Spill Bill in Seven-Day Special Session, OIL SPILL U.S. LAW
REP., May 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ZLW1 File (explaining the new
Act). The emphasis on jurisdictional boundaries is one of the Act's main attractions.
James Hanifen, project coordinator for the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,
points out that the jurisdictional delineations are important, because "[t]hat was one
of the first things I noticed upon my visit to Valdez during the response to the Exxon Valdez spill. It was never clear who was supposed to be in charge of what." Id.
71. LA. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 30:2483-2490 (West Supp. 1995).
72. Id § 30:2479.
73. TEXAS NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.107 (West Cum. Supp. 1995); see also Texas
Proposes New NRDA Rules, E & P ENV'T, Sept. 2, 1994. The proposed rules contain
explicit instructions regarding the NRDA process that trustees must follow and the
rules establish three types of assessments, expedited, comprehensive, and negotiated,
which are used according to the size of the spill. TEXAS NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §
40.107(c)(7)(A) (West Cure. Supp. 1995). The proposed rules do not apply to inland oil
spills or to hazardous substance spills which are covered by the federal OPA and
CERCLA. See Texas Proposes New NRDA Rules, supra
74. TEXAS NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.107(c)(7)(F) (West Cure. Supp. 1995).
75. Id. § 40.203. Therefore, under the Texas plan, the caps would not apply in a
case like the Exxon Valdez.
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use to determine natural resource61 damages and such damages
may include "passive use" values.
As these state NRDA rules demonstrate, assessing natural
resource damages under state law has become more regulated,
and frequently more expensive.7 However, because certain
states' regulations provide an alternative approach to traditional field studies, the process for assessing environmental damages from oil spills has been improved.78 Moreover, because the
state provisions generally complement the federal regulations,
natural resource damage assessment has become easier to administer nationwide.
E. Ohio v. Department of the Interior: JudicialAcceptance of
Passive-Use Values
The federal natural resource damage assessment techniques
previously discussed were proposed in 1991.7'

DOI's former

damage assessment techniques, which focused on the economic
costs of environmental damage from toxic spills, came under
attack from several states, three environmental organizations,
and certain industry organizations in 1989.80 The environmentalists charged that economic calculations invariably shortchanged the environment because market-based valuation alone
does "not take into account the long-term, intangible losses

76. Id. § 40.107(4).
77. The Washington Department of Ecology points out that "[t]he cost of conducting these natural resource damage assessment studies frequently exceeded the actual
value of the lost or damaged resources." Rules for Assessing Damages from Oil Spills
Proposed by the Washington State Department of Ecology, P.R. Newswire, Nov. 26,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, P.R. Newswire File.
78. See, e.g., TEXAS NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.107(a)(3).
79. See supra part I.
80. See Ohio v. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Petitioners
included the National Wildlife Foundation and the Chemical Manufacturers Association.
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from a disaster like the Exxon Valdez."8 Therefore, they argued, companies like Exxon would get off too easily.82
In Ohio v. Department of the Interior," environmental
groups challenged the regulations, insisting that CERCLA requires damages to be sufficient to pay for restoring, replacing
or acquiring the equivalent of the damaged resource in every
case . ' Existing regulations had required government agencies
to assess the "lesser of" restoration costs or lost use values
(without restoration) when calculating natural resource damages.85 The environmentalists argued that because lost use values are lower than the cost of restoration in most cases, damage awards determined pursuant to DOI's old rule are generally
too small to pay for the costs of restoration." The groups also
claimed that the rules relied too heavily on the market prices of
natural resources, thus failing to give enough weight to the
long-term benefits of unspoiled wilderness. 7
Several industry groups also challenged the regulations,
claiming that the regulations would lead to overstated damages.88 DOI defended its rules, arguing that "CERCLA does not
prescribe any floor for damages but instead leaves to Interior
the decision of what the measure of damages will be."89 Although recovered damages must be spent on restoration, DOI
asserted that "the amount recovered from the responsible parties need not be sufficient to complete the job."90

81. John Lancaster, Method for Assessing Oil-Spill Damages Hit; Environmentalists Fault Interior, THE WASH. POST, June 26, 1989, at Al-AS. More than 60 members of Congress and major environmental groups had called on the Bush administration to seek a harsher remedy by a court. Id. at AS. "A jury can better assess the
enormity of that damage than by attempting to use an adding machine and a pile of
reimbursement receipts," said Rep. Robert G. Torricelli of New Jersey. Id.
82. Id.
83. 880 F.2d at 432.
84. Id.; see also supra part II1(A) (discussing CERCLA requirements).
85. The original type B rule also allowed for the assessment of lost nonuse values
only if trustee officials could not establish any lost use values. 59 Fed. Reg. 23,098,
23,100 (1994).
86. U.S. Appeals Court Shoots Down Interior on Environment Damage Assessments
Rules, PLATTfS OILGRAM NEWS, July 17, 1989, at 3 [hereinafter U.S. Appeals Court].
87. Lancaster, supra note 81 at A5.
88. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 477-78.
89. Id. at 442.
90. Id.
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In Ohio, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia ruled in favor of the environmentalists by invalidating key provisions within the NRDA regulations.9 The
court found that the existing rules ran contrary to Superfimd
law and congressional intent because Congress had demonstrated "a distinct preference for using restoration costs as the measure of damages, [which] precludes a 'lesser of' rule which totally ignores that preference."92 Therefore, the court ordered DOI
to revise those regulations to establish the primacy of restoration costs over lost use values and to include the loss of passive-use values to the extent that they could be reliably calculated.9 3
According to the court, the legislative language made it "logical to presume that Congress intended responsible parties to be
liable for damages in an amount sufficient to accomplish its
restorative aims."9 However, the court determined that DOrs
rule "assumes that Congress purposely formulated a statutory
scheme that would doom to failure its goals of restoration in a

91. Id.
92. Id. at 444. The court supported this conclusion by noting that "a distinct
preference for restoration costs as the measure of damages is contained in § 107(f)(1)
of CERCLA." Id. The court determined that the prior regulations "improperly established a strong presumption in favor of market value of lost resources instead of
restoration costs as a measure of damages." Interior Bows to Court Order Nixing Key
Points of Spill Damage Assessment, PLATr'S OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 11, 1989, at 3.
93. 880 F.2d at 464. The Ohio court established the primacy of restoration costs
over lost use values, unless those costs are grossly disproportionate in relation to the
use value of a damaged resource. Critics have complained, however, that none of the
legislation or newly proposed regulations deal effectively with what constitutes restoration or grossly disproportionate costs and that an accurate cost-effective analysis is
not possible if restoration remains undefined. Emery N. Castle et al., Natural Resource Damage Assessment: Speculations About a Missing Perspective, 70 LAND ECON.
378, 379-80 (1994). "As it stands, the CERCLA damage assessment process does not
provide [enough] guidance for compiling the needed ecological information, or for determining appropriate restorative actions." Id. at 380.
94. 880 F.2d at 445.
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majority of cases." 5 Therefore, the "'lesser of rule' [was] directly contrary to the express intent of Congress." 6
The court also overturned the Hierarchy of Assessment Method and remanded the Public Ownership Rule for further
clarification.9 7 The Hierarchy of Assessment Method "establish[es] a rigid hierarchy of permissible methods for determining 'use values,' limiting recovery to the price commanded by
the resource on the open market, unless the trustee finds that
the 'market for the resource is not reasonably competitive.'"98
The court said that market value can serve as one factor to be
considered, but that "it is unreasonable to view market price as
the exclusive factor, or even the predominant one."99 In discussing the Hierarchy of Assessment Method, the court pointed
out that "[f~rom the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail
darter, natural resources have values that aren't fully captured
by the market system."'
The court upheld many other provisions in the regulations.
First, the "committed use" requirement, which limits trustees to
considering only "committed" public uses when ascertaining the
"uses made of a resource," was upheld.'' The court said that

95.

Id. The court cited a hypothetical example to illustrate its point:
[I]magine a hazardous substance spill that kills a rookery of fur seals
and destroys a habitat for seabirds at a sealife reserve. [Under DOI's
rule] [t]he lost use value of the seals and seabird habitat would be measured by the market value of the fir seals' pelts (which would be approximately $15 each) plus the selling price per acre of land comparable
in value to that on which the spoiled bird habitat was located. Even if,
as likely, that use value turns out to be far less than the cost of restoring the rookery and seabird habitat, it would nonetheless be the only
measure of damages eligible for the presumption of recoverability under
the Interior rule.
Id. at 442 (footnotes omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 454-64. The Public Ownership Rules were challenged for limiting the
"availability of natural resource damages to cases where the resources harmed ...
[were] owned by federal, state, local or foreign governments, rather than private parties." Id. at 459. The court remanded the record to DOI to clarify whether its own
regulations applied to lands not owned by the government. Id. at 461.
98. Id. at 462 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1) (1994)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 462-63.
101. Id. at 461. A committed use is a "current public use; or a planned public use
of a natural resource ...established before a discharge of oil or hazardous substance
is detected." Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(h) (1994)).
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it is an "eminently reasonable construction of the statute
[CERCLA, because it avoids the need for unreliable, and likely
self-serving, speculation regarding future possible uses." °2
Secondly, The "10% Discount Rate," a procedure used to calculate the present value of an expected future injury, was upheld.' °3 Although the court acknowledged that "the proper discount rate is always a matter of uncertainty," it deferred to
DOrs choice of ten percent."' Third, the regulation allowing
potentially responsible parties to conduct natural resource damage assessments if authorized by a government official was also
upheld.' Fourth, limits on the liability of responsible parties
for the reasonable costs of assessing damages were upheld as
well,0 6 because the regulations merely limit "the definition of
'reasonable costs' to situations where the 'anticipated cost of the
assessment is expected to be less than the anticipated damage
' ' 7 The court stated that "[t]he idea behind Interior's
amount.""
regulation was that it is wasteful to devote more resources to a
damage assessment than can be recovered by the trustee for
the loss of the resource itself."'
The court also accepted regulations establishing an "acceptance criteria" as a framework for determining whether a hazardous substance release actually caused injury to a particular
biological resource."° And although CERCLA does not clearly
preclude recovery of punitive damages, the court found no fault
with the lack of provisions providing for the recovery of puni-

102. Id at 462.
103. Id. at 464-65.
104. Id. at 465 & n.46. The ten percent discount rate was adopted from the Office
of Management and Budget Circular A, dated March 27, 1972. OMB's current circular
reports the discount rate at seven percent. DOI solicited comment on setting the
discount rate in a recent notice of proposed rulemaking. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 53,755
(1994).
105. Id. at 466. The applicable regulation is codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.32(d) (1994).
The court stated that notification of potentially responsible parties during all stages
of the assessment process, while the public is denied the same, is not unreasonable
"[g]iven that the public is notified and its comments are heard once an assessment
plan is drafted." Id. at 468.
106. Id. at 468.
107. Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(ee) (1994)). "CERCLA imposes liability on responsible parties for . . . [the] 'reasonable costs of assessing' natural resource damages."
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(C).
108. 880 F.2d at 468.
109. Id. at 468-73.
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tive damages."' Lastly, the court accepted the use of "contingent valuation," a controversial procedure used to assess the
value of resources that are "non-marketed.""'
In a separate, but related decision, the court of appeals also
held that DOI's type A regulations providing simplified procedures for assessing natural resource damages in a limited class
of cases are reasonable in the face of ambiguous statutory language and technical uncertainties."
However, the type A
rules were remanded to DOI[ to allow it to develop standard
procedures for simplified assessments consistent with the Ohio
decision."'
F. Damage Assessment After Ohio v. Department of the
Interior
In response to the Ohio decision, DOI revised the NRDA
regulations to dispose of the "lesser of' rule, include all use
values in the assessment of total compensable natural resource
damages, and establish restoration costs as the fundamental
measure of natural resource damages." 4 The new rules force
responsible parties to pay for the restoration or replacement
costs of damaged natural resources instead of simply the lost
use economic costs. Therefore, under the new NRDA regulations, the parties responsible for damaged resources must now
pay for both corollary economic losses and cleanup costs under
CERCLA." 5 This may largely increase the Superfund liability
of responsible parties at many sites." 6

110. Id. at 474.
111. Id. at 479-80. See infra part IV.A. for more on contingent valuation. The
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) and other industry groups challenged the
contingent valuation method. The Cleanup Bill Rises, CHEMICAL WEEK, July 26, 1989,
at 16. According to Barbara Hinden of CMA, "We felt it was too speculative to use
that approach and could reflect the bias of the trustees making the decision." Id. at
17.
112. Colorado v. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 487, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
113. Id. at 491.
114. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749 (1994). Now trustee officials
may recover all restoration costs in all cases.
115. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (1994).
116. See PRP's May Have to Restore Nature, SUPERFUND, May 17, 1991.
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Under the new rules, natural resource trustees are also given
greater administrative discretion regarding restoration costs." 7
While the rules identify the factors to be considered in determining the alternatives for restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and acquisition of equivalent resources, trustee officials
determine the relative weight of the factors."' Industry representatives and environmental groups believe that this could
lead to much higher cleanup costs than had been expected." 9
However, because the Ohio court determined that Congress had
intended for polluters to pay for the full restoration of damaged
resources,'2 the trustees' discretion is a necessary part of
NRDA, as it allows trustees to use the best available methods,
of valuation.
The Department of the Interior must review and revise the
NRDA regulations biennially.' 2 Therefore, changes such as
the addition of type A assessment procedures and revisions to
passive-use determinations must be considered regularly. For
117. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,264, 14,285-86 (1994).
118. 43 C.F.R. § 11.82 (1994). See Castle et al., supra note 93, at 378, for a list of
factors to consider, including:.
(1) technical feasibility; (2) the relationship of expected costs of the proposed action to the expected benefits; (3) cost effectiveness; (4) the results
of any actual response actions; (5) potential for any additional injury; (6)
the natural recovery period; (7) ability of the resource to recover, (8)
acquisition of equivalent land for federal management where restoration,
rehabilitation, and/or other replacement is not possible; (9) potential effect
of the action on human health and safety; and (10) consistency with
applicable federal state laws and policies.
Id. at 379.
119. The Cleanup Bill Rises, supra note 111, at 17. The Ohio decision "raises the
possibility of a higher level of damages to be paid by all potentially responsible parties at Superfund sites." Id. (quoting Barbara Hinder, Chemical Manufacturers Association general counsel). Oil industry representatives also assert that tanker liability
under OPA may be too costly. Although the Act sets limits on damages, "some experts say that there are so many exception clauses that no tanker operator can envision an accident where such limits would apply," and therefore, "it may be too costly
to enter U.S. waters." Marguerite Holloway, Soiled Shores; Prince William Sound Oil
Spill, 1989; Trends in Environmental Technology, 265 Sci. Ai. 102 (1991). American
marine insurers have also said that the proposed OPA NRDA regulations will effectively "rid from U.S. waters all forms of watercraft, commercial as well as private."
Gerald Karey, Regulation and The Environment, PLASr's OiLGRAM NEWS, Nov. 14,
1994, at 3 (comments on the proposed NOAA NRDA rules).
120. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 439, 444.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(3). DOI initiated a biennial review of the NRDA regulations in October 1994. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749 (1994) (comments were accepted through
Jan. 17, 1995).
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example, in 1994, DOI issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
to revise the NRDA regulations by adding an additional type A
procedure for assessing natural resource damages in Great
Lakes environments.'2 2 The additional type A procedure divides the Great Lakes area into a series of rectangular grids
and assigns a habitat type to each cell within the grids.'
Under the proposed rule, trustee officials cannot modify the
habitat designations in the final version of the model if they
wish to obtain a rebuttable presumption for their assessments."
The National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
is expected to issue its own rules in early 1 9 9 5.' The procedures will include a computer model for assessing natural resource damages based on information about the amount of oil
spilled, the location of the spill, the movement of spilled oil,
and the mortality rates of fish and waterfowl.'2 6 The model
will take into account passive-use values such as losses suffered
by people who don't actually use the injured resource as well as
restoration costs. 7 Some economic analysts contend that this
model will greatly overstate estimates of natural resource damages," 8 however, the new rules will be in keeping with congressional intent, as revealed in the Ohio decision.

122. 59 Fed. Reg. 40,319 (1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (proposed Aug.
8, 1994). The rulemaking incorporates a computer model called the Natural Resource
Damage Assessment Model for Great Lakes Environments Version 1.31. On November
2, 1994, the Department extended the period for comment through February 6, 1995,
and solicited comment on an additional aspect of the type A procedure. 59 Fed. Reg.
54,877 (1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (proposed Nov. 2, 1994).
123. 59 Fed. Reg. 40,319.
124. 59 Fed. Reg. 54,877. DOI solicited comments until February 6, 1995, on
whether to revise the rule to allow trustee officials to modify the habitat designations
in the final version and still obtain a rebuttable presumption. Id.
125. Karey, supra note 119, at 3. It is expected that the OPA rules will run parallel to the CERCLA regulations for natural resources damage assessment. 59 Fed. Reg.
14,262, 14,262 (1994).
126. Karey, supra note 119, at 3. Some state regulations provide for similar assessment considerations. See e.g., TEXAS NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.107 (West Cunm.
Supp. 1995).
127. Karey, supra note 119, at 3.
128. Id. Economic Analysts, Inc., which was hired by the Water Quality Insurance
Syndicate (a pool of marine insurers that insures liabilities from oil and hazardous
substances pollution) believes that the computer simulated spills produce damage
estimates larger than those actually occurring for much larger spills. Id. at 2.
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IV. CAN THERE BE ACCURATE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT?

"The fundamental problem of damage valuation for the per se
loss of wildlife is that the intrinsic worth of natural resources
does not conveniently fit the terms of economic accountability."'9

Although we can easily discuss and see the effects of environmental damage, calculating such damage is not an easy task.
While some environmental resources already have established
market values, many others are not so readily defined. Even
though the regulations tell us how to assess damages, it remains to be seen whether we can accurately put a monetary
value on the environment. Even if a resource has a market
value, that market value may not constitute its only "real"
value. In order to maintain a clean environment, however, we
must assign monetary values because monetary penalties may
be used to remedy environmental damage and deter subsequent
environmentally unsound behavior.
The immediate damage to Alaska's environment following the
Exxon Valdez spill was unequivocally significant. At least
400,000 birds and a third of the area's sea otters were destroyed, the most killed by any oil spill in history. 3 ' But what
is a bird really worth? In the past, the federal government
assessed damages by assigning market values to dead wildlife
and injured natural resources, such as $15 for a fur seal or
$35.74 for a Canada goose."' But the Ohio court determined
that market valuation methods alone do not adequately compensate the public, and therefore ordered DOI to revise the
rules so that natural resource trustees would give more weight

129. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAw, AND SOcIETY 168 (1992).
130. Lauren Neergaard, Exxon Challenges Damage Claims, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 15, 1993, at B1. Government scientists estimate that 10 percent of the
common murres in the Gulf of Alaska region were killed; about one-fifth of the seaotter population was killed; and 153 bald eagle carcasses were found. Bill Dietrich,
Alaska: Surviving the Spill-The Impact on Wildlife Still Uncertain, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 25, 1991, at Al, AS.
131. John Lancaster, Value of Intangible Losses from Exxon Valdez Spill Put at $3
Billion, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1991, at A4. The price for a Canada goose has
been "derived from analyzing their popularity among hunters." Id.
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to intangible losses when assessing the cost of natural resource
damages.' 3 ' Therefore, old techniques have been revived and
new techniques have been developed to assist scientists, economists, and lawyers assess environmental damage more accurately.
A. Passive-Use Values and the Contingent Valuation Method
The concept of "existence" or "passive-use" values was first
advanced in 1967.' Since then the concept of nonuse values
has broadened and a variety of environmental assessment
methodologies have been proposed. Non-market techniques,
such as the travel cost method, the hedonic price method, and
the unit day value method, have been developed to determine
"shadow prices" for non-market resources." Shadow prices
reflect amounts that resource users would spend to use a particular resource. They are used to calculate the economic value
of the present use of a damaged non-market resource.' 35
The contingent valuation method has gained the most support from environmentalists because it directly addresses environmental assets which are not commercially valuable. 3 6 The
contingent valuation method measures the passive uses of the
environment by using public opinion polls in which people are

132. Ohio v. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
133. Castle et al., supra note 93, at 381. Passive-use values also encompass "nonuse" values. According to Castle, J. Krutilla first advanced the idea, noting that "people may experience satisfaction from knowing the natural environment is protected
from irreversible allocation decisions." Id.
134. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (1994). See PLATER ET AL., supra note 129, at 56-58. A
variety of non-market techniques have been suggested for non-market resources, including: (1) the travel cost method, which uses the cost of travel to a recreation site
as a surrogate for the price of recreation services; (2) the hedonic price method,
which attempts indirectly to find the effect of the resource injury on the price of
other resources like land; (3) the unit day value method, which determines the value
per day of various recreational activities using a table of values; and (4) the contingent valuation method, which uses a public survey to determine the public's willingness to pay for environmental protection and/or restoration. Id.
135. PLATER ET AL., supra note 129, at 57.
136. John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. Would Temper Oil-Spill Damage Calculation, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1994, § 1 at 9. Environmentalists consider contingent valuation to be
an important weapon as they seek compensation from polluters. Id. Under the NRDA
rule published March 24, 1994 trustee officials may use contingent valuation when
estimating lost use values. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(2)(vii) (1994).
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asked how much they would pay to preserve or protect a particular resource. 3 7 The dollar amounts are then multiplied by
the number of people potentially affected by an oil spill or hazardous waste release.'3 8 By assigning economic values to passive uses, the surveys determine what value the public places
on preserving wild species or natural resources that are never
actually bought or sold. Natural resource trustees can then use
the converted passive values in their damage calculations when
seeking compensation from parties liable for environmental
injuries.
3 9 enDeveloped by natural resource economists for DOI,"
dorsed by an advisory panel of economists, including two Nobel
laureates,' ° and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,' the contingent valuation method is currently the only, and thus the best, method available for estimating nonuse values.
According to its supporters, contingent valuation "can produce estimates reliable enough to be a
starting point for a judicial process of damage assessment."'

137.

See Alane Fitzgerald, Valdez Litigation Will Shape Future Environmental Law,

OFFSHORE, May 1991, at 81, 81.

138. Id. Exxon's chief counsel, John Seddelmeyer, opposed the method, explaining
that "[s]ince this group, by definition, is not limited to people who actually visit the
impacted area or live nearby, it arguably includes all of the people in the United
States. . . ." Id.
139. Id.

140. Panel of NRDA Experts Says CV Studies Are "Reliable Enough," OIL SPILL
U.S. LAW REP., Feb. 1993 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ZLW1 File [hereinafter
Panel of NRDA Experts]. The contingent valuation and damage assessment panel
appointed by NOAA acknowledges that contingent valuation has become the subject of
"great controversy" in the last five years, but the panel also points out that any
method of assessing nonuse values would be controversial. Id. The panel suggests
that contingent valuation is controversial in part because of the 'impossibility of
validating externally the results of [contingent valuation] studies." Id.
141. Ohio v. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
142. 59 Fed. Reg. 23,098, 23,100 (1994).
143. Peter Passell, Economic Watch; Disputed New Role for Polls: Putting a Price
Tag on Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at 36; see also Richard C. Bishop and
Michael P. Welsh, Existence Values in Benefit-Cost Analysis and Damage Assessment,
68 LAND ECON. 405, 405 (1992) (stating that the $12 million needed to prevent the
striped shiner's extinction is a pure existence value); Richard C. Bishop and Kevin J.
Boyle, Valuing Wildlife in Benefit Cost Analysis: A Case Study Involving Endangered
Species, WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 23:943-50 (1987) (stating that contingent valuation was used to estimate that Wisconsin taxpayers would pay about $12 million
annually to prevent the extinction of the striped shiner in Wisconsin although the
striped shiner had no known present or future uses).
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Used to calculate the Exxon Valdez spill damage at $3 billion,
the method may have helped to convince Exxon to settle at $1.1
billion before the survey was introduced as evidence.' While
there was no guarantee that a judge and jury would have relied
on the $3 billion estimate, "[flederal officials defended the settlement as a landmark penalty that avoids a costly and uncertain trial while providing immediate cash for cleanup and restoration."'45
Although contingent valuation has been judicially approved,
the appropriate use of the method and the estimation of passive-use values in general have continued to cause debate. Contingent valuation has been criticized by the oil industry and
economists accustomed to using market transactions to reveal
value." Certain problems are apparent; for example, one critic points out that the "[slurvey techniques .

.

. are inherently

limited by the fact that the conclusions are based on what
people say they would do-not on what they have done. " '
Additionally, the results of a survey can vary significantly depending on how the questions are worded. Other critics argue
that the hypothetical questions may be incorrect because the
designers of contingent valuation surveys may not have the
biological knowledge necessary to specify the effects of environmental damage.'

However, according to a report issued by the NOAA panel of
experts, "a well-designed [contingent valuation] study will mini144. See Lancaster, supra note 131, at A4. Economists conducted the confidential
studies for the state of Alaska and the federal government by surveying 1,000 households nationwide through face-to-face interviews in which they displayed photos and
asked interviewees how much they would pay to protect Prince William Sound. The
preliminary results showed a median amount of $30 per household, which calculates
to $3 billion estimating that there are 100 million households in the U.S. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Passell, supra note 143, at Al.
147. Id. (citing more anomalies and problems arising from random surveys). The
Ohio court addressed industry's concern with the overstatement of damages when
using contingent valuation and stated that an "obvious safeguard against overstatement . . . is more sophisticated questioning." Ohio v. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d
432, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
148. See Castle et al., supra note 93, at 379. Emery Castle points out that those
who design and administer contingent valuations surveys must carefully consider how
much information to provide as context for the hypothetical questions to be asked.
Although complex biological considerations are involved, biological scientists and ecologists have been consulted only casually and infrequently. Id. at 382-83.
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mize many of the problems inherent in the technique."' To
minimize reliability questions and concerns, the panel has provided a list of guidelines for designing an ideal contingent valuation study.5 ' The NOAA panel recommends that contingent
valuation survey questions include extensive information and
consider "three recovery scenarios: (a) 'immediate' restoration,
(b) accelerated restoration, and (c) natural restoration."' Observers say that the State of Alaska apparently used this method, setting damages as the difference between (a) and (b), based
on the assumption that Exxon would provide for the accelerated
restoration.'52 For future contingent valuation research, the
panel suggests that DOI produce standard damage assessments
for a few specific small and large oil spills, either hypothetical
or actual, which could then serve as benchmarks for future
studies.'
The Panel's recommendations appear to be based on an assumption that recovery or restoration will occur." This assumption leaves open, however, the question of whether recovery will be accelerated by human intervention. If the population
size of a natural species affected by an oil spill or hazardous
waste release will generally return to pre-contamination levels,
then passive-use value losses amounting to $4 billion and lost
recreational values equaling $3.8 million may not seem plausible.""55
' The fact that certain natural resources eventually recover on their own provides environmental polluters with an
argument against contingent valuation studies and other passive-use damage assessment methodologies.'

149. Panel of RDA Experts, supra note 140.
150. See Castle et al., supra note 93, at 379; Panel of NRDA Experts, supra note
139.
151. Castle et al., supra note 93, at 383.
152. Id.
153. Panel of NRDA Experts, supra note 140.
154. See Castle et al., supra note 93, at 383.
155. Id.
156. One group of commentators have pointed out that "Ithe estimation of passiveuse values by contingent valuation, or other techniques, is unnecessary for effective
protection from natural resource damage events." Castle et al., supra note 93, at 384.

However, environmentalists and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
would be sure to disagree. Under a proposed rule published December 8, 1994 a

"Restoration Submodel" would not even compute habitat restoration costs if the relevant habitat restoration would result in a higher total injury than reliance upon
natural recovery. 59 Fed. Reg. 63,300, 63,310 (1994).
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However, contingent valuation and passive-use considerations
may be crucial to damage assessments in certain locations.
Passive-use values will become more important to less developed areas, as use values alone may not sufficiently justify restorative efforts. Because the Alaskan wilderness affected by
the Exxon Valdez spill was largely recreational and non-commercial land and water, passive-use values comprised a large
portion of the Exxon Valdez damages.'5 7

B. More Problems to Consider When Assessing Natural
Resource Damages
While critics argue that contingent valuation may over-value
the environment, a number of variables may counteract any
over-valuation. First, environmental damage caused by hazardous waste may linger for decades or mushroom
exponentially.15 8 Years may pass before scientists accurately
assess the overall damage incurred. For example, ten years
after the hazardous waste problems at Love Canal were officially recognized, scientists were still assessing the environmental
damage in the area.'59 And five years after the Exxon Valdez
accident scientists were only beginning to study the spill's long
term affects. 6 °
True cleanup may also prove to be an elusive goal. Twenty
years after the Kepone incident, the toxic chemical continues to

157. Castle et al., supra note 93, at 379.
158. See generally Richard C. Paddock, Spill's Effects Could Linger for 50 Years;
Environment: The Upper Sacramento River's Aquatic Life May Need 20 Years to Return to Levels of Last July, Before a Train Derailed and Spilled Pesticide, a Study
Says, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at A3 (explaining how a 1991 toxic pesticide spill in
the upper Sacramento River could linger for over fifty years).
159. See Michael H. Brown, A Toxic Ghost Town: Ten Years Later, Scientists Are
Still Assessing the Damage from Love Canal, THE ATLANTA CONST., July, 1989, at 23.
Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation had dumped 43.6 million pounds of process
slurries, waste solvents, and pesticide residues into an abandoned canal, now known
as Love Canal. Id. Within 10 years after this toxic-waste dump was discovered, approximately $150 million had been spent to sample the air, groundwater, and soil, to
survey local health problems, to buy residents' homes and move those residents, and
to abate and clean up the pollution. Id.
160. Natalie Phillips, Spill's Legacy Lingers, Researchers Say Damage Continues,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1994, at C1.
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contaminate the James River and Chesapeake Bay. 6 ' Six
years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Prince William Sound is
still contaminated.'62 While some scientists feel that nature-not Exxon-should be credited for any improvements to
the environment, others question whether the cleanup was even

worth the cost, both ecologically and financially. 6 '
Unfortunately, cleanup efforts themselves may damage the

environment. For example, the high-pressure, hot-water blasting
treatment used to remove oil washed ashore after the Exxon
Valdez incident left some areas upstream virtually dead and
others downstream fundamentally impaired.' Bioremediation
and accelerated fertilization, possibly the most natural methods
of cleanup, are effective only to the extent that the area involved is responsive to such treatment. 6 ' Some fertilizers

used in Prince William Sound may have even caused algal
blooms and injured area mammals.'6 6 Dispersants used to
break up oil slicks into droplets contain highly toxic compounds

161. Springston, supra note 13, at AI-A12. Because Kepone tends to remain toxic
and not break down, it is "a long-lived environmental threat . . [that] might remain
in the James for hundreds of years." Id. at A12.
162. See id. The assessor's prejudices will further complicate damage assessment
because each assessor may view contamination differently. See Dietrich, supra note
130, at A5. For example, when Sue Libenson of the Alaska Center for the Environment showed a bag of oily mussels to an oil executive, the executive pointed out that
the mussels were still alive. Id. Exxon's research shows that damage from the spill
lasted only a few months, while the U.S. government's research shows that long-term
recovery is far from complete. Id.
163. See Holloway, supra note 119, at 104. John Farrinton, associate director of
education for the Woody Hole Oceanographic Institute, asserts that the removal of oil
from a marsh in Brittany "destroyed portions of the marsh for much longer than it
would have if we had allowed nature to take its course." Id. at 106. Alaska's rich
environment and powerful storms helped to speed the cleansing process. See Dietrich,
supra note 130, at A5.
164. See Holloway, supra note 119, at 105. According to one environmental scientist, hot-water and pressurized treatment "kills any animals that are still alive, and
it has a tendency to work oil into the sediments further.'" Id. The hot-water washes
loosened oil from the upper stretches of beach where oil-tolerant species or few organisms live, which then flowed downstream into the habitats of relatively sensitive
organisms. Id. The pressure of the hot-water washes also de-stabilizes gravel and
sand beaches. Id. NOAA studies have shown that in some areas, the hot-water treatment killed more wildlife than if the oil had been left to weather naturally. See also
Dietrich, supra note 130, at A5 (discussing the effects of oil cleanup).
165. See generally Holloway, supra note 119, at 111 (discussing bioremediation at
Prince William Sound).
166. Id-
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that can destroy certain sealife populations." 7 Another remedial alternative, oil burning, can get rid of most of an oil slick,
but it will release heavier, more toxic hydrocarbons into the air
than would normally evaporate.' Even if they were not damaging, both dispersants and oil burning techniques must be
used immediately to be effective. Therefore, any court order or
post-damage assessment action would be too late.
Simply researching environmental damage assessment techniques has also caused problems. In August 1994, a ship researching how to contain oil spills accidentally released about
200 gallons of diesel fuel off the coast of the Florida Keys.'
When state and federal researchers were building evidence
against Exxon in their separate lawsuits, they "killed ducks,
seabirds, deer, seals, sea lions, and other animals. The 400-plus
birds killed by researchers total more than half the number
that were found alive after the March 1989 spill, scrubbed
clean and released in a $25 million, Exxon-funded bird rescue
effort."' Although 36,000 frozen bird carcasses had been recovered and kept as evidence, researchers maintained that
"fresh kills" were a required standard procedure. 7' State researchers also killed animals to study long-term contamination,
which could be more deadly than the initial pollution from the
spill.172
C. The Future of Contingent Valuation and Passive-Use Values
In January 1994, the Clinton Administration "called for a
conservative approach to calculating how much compensation

167. For more on dispersants and oil burning, see id. at 114.
168. For information regarding testing the effectiveness of oil burning, see id.
169. Catherine Wilson, Research Ship Runs Aground on Coral Reef, Leaks Diesel
on Fragile Keys Reef, SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 12, 1994, at C1. Although the ship was on
a mission to research pollution and how to contain oil spills, the Coast Guard
planned to unload approximately 45,000 gallons of diesel fuel from the ship itself. Id.
170. David Postman, More Losses in Prince William Sound: Government Kills Wildlife for Evidence; Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Investigation, THE OIL DAILY, Oct. 30, 1990,
at 4 (explaining that "wildlife kills are a standard procedure . . . a standard scientific
process.")
171. Id. According to federal and state officials working on the spill lawsuit, the
Justice Department recommended such research, but the Justice Department has
denied any knowledge of the research. Id.
172. Id.
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The Administration

said that it would rather underestimate environmental damage
than overestimate it by relying too heavily on non-market valuation techniques.' Therefore, NOAA rules proposed in January 1994 suggested that certain passive-use values be discounted by fifty percent.'
According to one NOAA official, strict
to make passive-use valuastandards were being set in order
76
"litigation-proof."
tion techniques
Continued litigation, however, is inevitable. Although the
Ohio court upheld the validity of contingent valuation and other
social cost studies for valuing environmental catastrophes, questions regarding the reliability of such studies remain.77 Because a contingent valuation study cannot be specifically validated, the results of a contingent valuation survey might not
hold up in court. Despite the rebuttable presumption of accuracy given to damage assessments performed in accordance with
the regulations, a jury may still question the results of a contingent valuation study when the defendant's experts present a
significant amount of evidence contrary to the study. 78
Market-based values, such as cleanup costs and measurable
financial damages, may be relatively easy to compute, but the
question of intangible losses will continue to spark debate. Even
as shadow prices, contingent valuation, and other passive-use
valuation techniques receive wider acceptance by industry and
economists, such techniques, however, will still "omit values of

173. Cushman, supra note 136, at 9.
174. Id.
175. Id. NOAA's proposed rules would apply only to oil spills, but DOI was expected to adopt the same sort of rules to cover hazardous substances. Id.
176. Id. (statement by Linda Burlington, NOAA official).
177. See Castle et al., supra note 93, at 379 ("[iut is at once both the 'least
reliable' method for assessing passive-use values under 1991 DOI proposed rules and
the only method for doing so."). William K. Reilly of the EPA has said that such
studies "have their place . . . [but] they're new, there's not a lot of litigation, and
courts haven't awarded anything on the basis of how much somebody says they're
willing to pay to save a river otter." Lancaster, supra note 131, at A4.
178. Passell, supra note 143, at 36. Although oil industry representatives believe
that "the chances of getting hit hard with a damage award for lost passive-use may
be low, . . . the sums involved are so large that they are bound to affect commerce."
Industry observers say that the risk of paying exorbitant damage costs might make it
impossible for some industries to obtain liability insurance or even to stay in business. Id.
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great significance," because such pricing methods still focus on
quasi-commercial values.' 9 However, "both the willingness to
pay and willingness to accept contingent valuation data provide
evidence that passive-use values do, in fact exist empirically,"'180 and will, in fact, continue to affect natural resource
damage assessment.
V. THE EMERGENCE OF LITIGATION-DRIVEN SCIENCE
A. Key Precedents Set by the Exxon Valdez Litigation
While the Kepone incident shocked the public, the Exxon
Valdez accident forever changed the public's perception of environmental catastrophe and liability. As the largest oil spill in
U.S. history, it has become one of the most studied, and possibly the most influential, oil spill in history.'' Because the
technology available in 1989 proved unable to contend with the
spill, the incident "catalyzed a reevaluation of cleanup technology" and sparked final enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990.182

Although Exxon eventually settled with the state of Alaska
and the federal government, paying $1.1 billion in fines in
1991, the spill litigation, cleanup efforts, and scientific research
did not end with the settlement. New standards in environmental settlements, natural resource damage assessment, and scientific research emerged from the accident. First, the litigation
surrounding the Exxon spill affected the future of natural resource damage assessment by providing a proving ground for

179. PLATER ET AL., supra note 129, at 57 (stating that a "technique like the
travel cost method . . .produces only a lower bound estimate of the costs involved"
when the environment is damaged.) (quoting E. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT COST
ANALYSIS 136-38 (2d ed. 1990)).

180. Castle et al., supra note 93, at 381.
181. See generally Holloway, supra note 119, at 104. Large oil spills galvanize
public concern, yet the U.S. Coast Guard reports that only five percent of the estimated 2.3 million tons of petroleum hydrocarbons entering the seas each year comes
from tanker accidents. Id.
182. Id. The incident "tore off the veil of preparedness worn by U.S. industry and
by federal and local governments." Id. at 103. According to Holloway, "the findings of
scientists assessing the damage to the Sound and the subsequent recovery of the
environment may shape the direction of cleanup and prevention technologies for years
to come, both nationally and internationally." Id at 104.
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contingent valuation and large settlement negotiations. In fact,
the Exxon Valdez settlement may have set a standard for future large spill cases. Some industry representatives fear that
people will now expect monumental settlements, even where the
environmental impact is not severe. Others see the settlement
as "a positive step for industry" because "it was within Exxon's
ability to pay and was initiated by a governor willing to court
the oil and gas business."" As passive-use values play a larger role in natural resource damage assessment and settlement
negotiations, the methods used to assess such damages will become more controversial. However, if the public expects exorbitant settlements for hazardous waste discharges and oil spills,
damage assessment techniques that include passive-use values
may receive less criticism.
By agreeing to a settlement, the parties avoided an exhaustive legal dispute over the non-economic and passive-use environmental damages caused by Exxon's oil. Consequently, the
parties deferred questions regarding the contingent valuation
method of natural resource damage assessment. Using contingent valuation, the Alaskan and federally funded damage assessment study determined that the actual cost of the Valdez
spill was well over $3 billion."M Although the contingent valuation method and its validity has been questioned by economists and industry representatives, it represents one of the best
available techniques under the regulations," and it would
have significant precedential value in future environmental
damage suits if accepted in a high profile case like Exxon.
By agreeing to the settlement, the parties also showed that
neither side knew how much a judge or jury would award in
compensatory damages. 8 ' While Exxon's experts point out
that the recovery from the spill has been dramatic, environmentalists point out that "nearly two-thirds of the 10.8 milliongallon oil spill... neither was recovered nor evaporated." 81
Because most of the oil dissipated into the environment, its
potential for long-term harmful effects is still in dispute. While

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Fitzgerald, supra note 137, at 81.
See id.
43 C.F.R. § 11.83(C)(2)(vii) (1994).
See Dietrich, supra note 130, at Al.
Id
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the injury incurred remains speculative and the experts assessing the damage have arrived at different figures, a jury could
have easily arrived at an unexpected or unprecedented damage
award."
As the environmental damage assessment figures increase, so
will settlement awards. And as the settlement awards increase,
so too will the industry's scrutiny of damage assessment methodologies. Within one year of the Kepone discovery, only
$800,000 had been spent to assess and cleanup the environmental damage caused by the Kepone release, whereas within one
year of the Exxon Valdez spill, $12.3 million had already been
spent assessing damage to the Alaska coastline.'8 9 Over the
years, natural resource damage assessment costs have risen
greatly and they may continue to rise,'90 reflecting both the
concentration of environmental statutes and the public's growing concern for the environment.

188. Today more companies are moving to clean up sites themselves, because "they
feel they can control costs better than [a court-] appointed third party." R.J. King,
Hazardous Waste, THE DETROITER, Mar. 1992 at 12, 15. (A. Barry Seymour, senior
vice president of Camp, Dresser & McKee, one of the nation's largest environmental
engineering firms.) Therefore, private cleanup efforts have become big business for
many companies specializing in hazardous waste cleanups. See id. at 12. "With
stricter environmental regulations in place, .. . [many companies] have seen sales
swell into the millions from revenues in the thousands just 20 years ago." Id.
Such
companies have grown quickly, due largely to recent environmental regulations,
"growing consumer expectations fueled by the media and widening recognition among
U.S. businesses that environmental action not only makes for sound citizenship but
good public relations as well." Id. at 13-14. According to the Environmental Business
Journal, revenues for environmental services totaled $132 billion in 1990, and industry revenues are likely to double by the end of the century. Id. at 14.
189. After only one year, nine federal agencies had spent $125.2 million, of which
$111.8 million went for actual cleanup, $12.3 million for damage assessment, and $1.1
million for other costs. Nick Snow, Valdez Clean-up Costs Nine Federal Agencies
$125.2 Million, THE OIL DAILY, Mar. 15, 1990, at 5, 5. "Four departments (Defense,
Transportation, Interior and Commerce) accounted for 94 percent of the total
costs. . . ." Id. All but one filed requests for reimbursement from the § 311(k) fund
established by the Clean Water Act and from Exxon Corp. Id.
190. In one case, a consent decree concluding a landmark 12-party agreement on a
federal Superfund cleanup in Puget Sound required that a minimum of $1 million be
spent on assessing natural resource damages incurred by the Tacoma waterfront,
restoring habitat, and rehabilitating the area's aquatic environment. Ongoing Enforcement Actions, EPA JOURNAL, July-Aug. 1991, at 6, 6. Routine environmental-compliance costs have risen as well, with large industrial companies now spending as much
as $450 million per year. King, supra note 188, at 14.
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B. The Emergence of Litigation-DrivenScience
The Exxon Valdez litigation did more than awaken the public
to environmental catastrophe and accident liability. The prominence of lawyers in all post-spill activities influenced subsequent scientific research, environmental cleanup efforts, and
natural resource damage assessment.
The emergence of litigation-driven science, coupled with the
legal sealing of scientific evidence related to oil spills and chemical releases, has affected scientific research and angered the
scientific community."9 Some scientists are concerned that
lawyers hinder spill response and scientific advancement because they advise their clients to withhold certain information
to protect them from future liability, thereby "polarizing the response."'92 Within two years of the Exxon oil spill, researchers
were claiming that science was playing "less of a role in fostering knowledge and shaping policy about the (Exxon Valdez)
spill than it [was] in laying the foundation for.., epic litigation in damage reimbursement." 3 Even the money well spent
on determining the spill's effects was tainted-much of the
original scientific funding focused on what would "generate the
greatest return in the litigation forum." 4 One environmental
protection officer has gone so far as to suggest that lawyers be
kept "out of the process until the players reach a point of nonagreement." 5 Lawyers have responded to such allegations
and suggestions, asserting that their immediate presence is
essential because local authorities may upstage and influence
an on-scene coordinator by threatening criminal charges.'96
191. Fitzgerald, supra note 137, at 82; see Lawyers and Scientists and Spills ...
Oh My, OIL SPILL U.S. LAW REP., April, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
ZLW1 File [hereinafter Lawyers and Scientists].
192. Lawyers and Scientists, supra note 191 (quoting June Lindstedt-Siva, environmental protection officer for ARCO).
193. Exxon Valdez: Data from Spill is Held Up by Litigation, GREENWIRE, Aug. 30,
1991 available in LEXIS, Environment Library, Greenwire File (statement by John
Balzar, L.A_ Times).
194. Fitzgerald, supra note 137, at 82 (statement by Harry Bader of the University
of Alaska-Fairbanks). Some commentators have suggested that NRDA studies be separated from scientific studies and response operations in terms of timing, funding, and
goals, so that the conclusion of litigation does not mark the conclusion of damage
assessment. See id. (discussing suggestions of June Lindstedt-Siva).
195. Lawyers and Scientists, supra note 191.
196. Id.
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Scientists have also raised concerns regarding the effects of
certain legal constraints on post-spill scientific research.'97
Scientific research and findings are traditionally shared and
discussed by the entire scientific community, but in a case like
the Exxon Valdez case, researchers may be forbidden to share
their results or even to say what type of research they are
performing.'98 Following the Exxon Valdez spill, the state of
Alaska sealed all of its scientific records indefinitely, while the
federal government sealed its findings until the settlement was
finalized.'99 The system that seals scientific evidence, however,
may be "robbing itself of its own best information,"2 "' because
joint efforts lead to better assessment techniques and more efficient cleanup. The sealing of government evidence and findings
may also adversely affect private litigants, the development of
fair oil spill law, and consequently, the public trust.2 01 Private

litigants unable to conduct their own studies may lose cases
when government information is unavailable, and scientists
hired by private companies like Exxon will be able to publicize
their 202findings and dominate the damage assessments figures.

197. See id. James Butler of Harvard University points out some reasons why science and law don't mix:
Lawyers prefer clear positive statements, but most scientific results, particularly in environmental fields, are ambiguous. As a result, lawyers
often put pressure on scientists to make conclusions when the scientists
do not feel comfortable doing so; the legal staff may take scientific results out of context and over-interpret them, or interpret them to support
the case when the results could very likely by interpreted the opposite
way; cross-examination is often phrased to make the expert witness appear less expert or less sure of his judgment; and lawyers often interpret
data collected by researchers into a view of the problem, but substantial
new data can sometimes change this view radically. Thus the interpretation may depend on the time when the question is asked.
Id.
198. Fitzgerald, supra note 137, at 82. According to Harry Bader of the University
of Alaska-Fairbanks, "[t]he scientists who are working on damage assessment can't
even talk to each other if they've got different projects." Id.
199. Id. The state of Alaska would not release its studies until it had assurances
that any negative conclusions about the state's role would not be used in lawsuits
against it. Dietrich, supra note 130, at A5.
200. Fitzgerald, supra note 137, at 82 (statement by Zygmunt Plater, professor of
law at Boston College). According to Plater, "plaintiffs' litigation-driven scientific experimentation7 has provided some of the best science and information regarding illnesses resulting from toxic chemicals. Id.
201. See id.
202. Id. Whether scientific evidence may be sealed is questionable in itself. Accord-
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VI.

CONCLUSION

It seems unlikely that the glaring disregard for the environment displayed at the Hopewell plant and the Love Canal will
occur today. Numerous environmental regulations, many of
which were enacted in the 1980's and 1990's, restrict industrial
dumping and disposal of all substances, not just hazardous
ones. Our environment, however, will continue to be assaulted
by the everyday, permitted discharges of hazardous substances,
as well as the large, accidental oil spills and waste releases.
Therefore, natural resource damage assessment regulations will
continue to develop and expand. In what manner they expand
may depend on a variety of factors, including further judicial
review of the NRDA regulations, additional evaluation of contingent valuation, cooperation between lawyers and scientists
regarding post-spill activities, and the lobbying activity of key
industry players.
As the future of natural resource damage assessment unfolds,
additional research and growing public awareness will continue
to affect future legislation. Whereas the Kepone incident led to
the creation of the Virginia Environmental Endowment Fund,
the Love Canal situation led to the identification of similar
problems nationwide and the creation of a federal Superfund
for their remediation. °3 Years later, the Exxon Valdez incident reinforced the need for OPA and the inclusion of passiveuse values. Research regarding damage assessment itself will
also lead to a better understanding of the environment itself
and its natural ability to recover from hazardous injuries.
Public trustees should be compensated for natural resource
damages for several reasons, including the compensation of
individual losers and the deterrence of future accidents, in addition to the restoration of the environment.2 However, the
parties responsible for environmental damages and the environ-

ing to Zygmunt Plater, Alaska's Freedom of Information Act and the federal Freedom
of Information Act may require the release of certain evidence or information once it

is no longer relevant to ongoing litigation. Id.
203. See Brown, supra note 159, at 23. The Exxon incident led to the final enactment of OPA.
204. See Castle et al., supra note 93, at 380-81 (expanding on these three reasons
for trustee reimbursement).
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mentalists trying to counteract the pollution may never agree
on just what amount of compensation is justified and reasonable. There are inherent problems with any process of assessing
damages to natural resources, and we may always question the
capacity of economists to account for all relevant passive-use
values empirically. However, the current regulations generally
provide for natural resource damage assessment that is both
cost effective and environmentally sound.
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